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Abstract: New launch vehicles have historically had significantly higher failure rates in early flights 
than what has been predicted using Probabilistic Risk Assessment - PRA.  This is because PRAs 
typically model a mature vehicle where a significant portion of the early failure probability contributors 
have been eliminated due to testing and improvements after actual field operation.  To capture a more 
accurate early flight failure probability estimate, this paper develops a method that estimates ascent 
failure probability starting with the first flight based on historical launch vehicle records.  With new 
launch vehicles being developed, such as the Space Launch System - SLS, a PRA model must be 
extended to cover early flight failure probability contributions that are either not covered in the mature-
vehicle PRA or are underestimated.  These failure probability contributions include design errors, 
quality control deficiencies, installation errors, and environmental impacts.  There are also failure 
dependencies due to systemic errors that still exist due to limited entire-system testing. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
New launch vehicles have historically had significantly higher failure probabilities in early flights than 
what has been predicted using Probabilistic Risk Assessment - PRA.  This is because PRAs typically 
model a mature vehicle where a portion of the failure probability has been mitigated due to testing and 
improvements after actual field operation.  To capture a more accurate early flight failure probability 
estimate, this paper develops a method that estimates ascent failure probability starting with the first 
flight based on historical launch vehicle records.  With new launch vehicles being developed, such as 
the Space Launch System - SLS, a PRA model must be extended to cover early flight failure probability 
areas that are either not covered in the mature-vehicle PRA or are underestimated.  These failure 
probability areas include design errors, quality control deficiencies, installation errors, and 
environmental impacts.  There are also failure dependencies due to systemic errors that still exist due to 
limited entire-system testing. 
 
The Launch Vehicle and Spacecraft Early Failure (LVSEF) database, otherwise known as the early 
failure database, has been developed to be used in qualitative and quantitative assessments of launch 
vehicles and spacecraft.  The early failure database documents launch vehicle and spacecraft flight 
histories including successes and failures, failure descriptions and failure causes. This paper builds on 
the launch failure probability work done originally for Ares I-X [1], and provides an example of the use 
of the database to assess the first launch failure probability of a hypothetical new launch vehicle that is 
similar to those being designed.   
 
2.  LVSEF DATABASE DESCRIPTION 
 
The early failure database is an Excel based tool that includes both launch vehicle flight history and 
design information.  Specifically, it includes: 
 US and worldwide launches from 1980 through December 2017, 
 Design information for each launch vehicle model, 
 The outcome of each launch, success/failure (failure can be loss of mission or vehicle), 
 Descriptions of failures, 
 Categorizations of where failure occurred and the effect, and 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20180006828 2019-08-31T17:58:15+00:00Z
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 Categorizations of causes. 
The early failure database may be used to obtain baseline quantitative assessments for new launch 
vehicles.  The baseline quantitative estimate of the failure probability that is obtained may then be 
updated with knowledge of the specific assurance program that is applicable or is planned.  This section 
describes how the baseline estimate can be obtained and how it can be updated and be refined based on 
assessment of a specific assurance program including an assessment of the measures taken for potential 
relevant historical failures previously identified.  The probability of failure assessed in this section is 
based on Loss of Mission (LOM) which would include a Loss of Vehicle (LOV). 
 
3.  QUANTITATIVE ASSESSMENTS FOR NEW LAUNCH VEHICLES 
 
3.1.  Empirical Baseline Assessment 
 
To estimate a baseline failure probability the relevant flight history of new launch vehicles is used.  For 
this assessment, a “new launch vehicle” is defined by a either a completely new vehicle design, or a new 
vehicle model that includes a significant modification to an existing model, e.g. a new engine, different 
upper stage, different configuration of strap-ons, etc.  The database was used to identify the outcomes 
of the first two launches of new launch vehicles.  Only “experienced” launch vehicle developers (must 
have at least 5 successful launches of one or more vehicles) were considered for the quantitative 
assessments.  Figure 1 shows histories for the individual launch vehicles and the outcomes for the first 
two flights.  The first two flights were used because the failure histories appear to be similar and the 
sample size is increased. A green bar indicates a success and a red bar indicates failure.  A blank implies 
that there was no second flight, or in some of cases the developer was considered a new developer for 
the 1st flight or the first flight was prior to the 1980 cutoff for the database. 
 
From the data in Figure 1, there were 151 total launch attempts with 15 failures.  Assuming a binomial 
distribution, the data yields an average failure probability estimate of 1 in 10 and 5th and 95th confidence 
bounds of 1 in 16 and 1 in 7 respectively.  The confidence bounds are the bounds on the average value 
and do not incorporate differences in the individual assurance program or the specific assurance program 
for a new launch vehicle.  
 
Figure 1: Experienced Developers New Launch Vehicle Flight Outcomes 
 
 
3.2.  More Specific Baseline Estimate of the Failure Probability by Synthesizing Individual 
System Failure Probabilities  
 
Launch vehicles can vary in their complexity with differing number of engines, stages, etc., and one 
with more complexity may be assumed to have a higher probability of failure than a simpler launch 
vehicle.  Using the early failure database, a more specific estimate for a new launch vehicle can be made 
using the launch statistics of individual design elements.   
 
3.3.  Developing Design Element Failure Probabilities 
 
Consider a new launch vehicle with the high level design shown in Table 1.  In addition to the design 
elements in the table, each launch vehicle is assumed to have avionics and thrust vector control (TVC) 
for each liquid engine and solid rocket motor. 
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Table 1: General Design Elements of Hypothetical New Launch Vehicle 
Basic Design Elements 
Number of Stages 2 
Fairing Separations 1 
1st Stage Design Elements 
Number of Liquid Engines 3 
Number of Solid Motors 2 
Upper Stage Design Elements 
Number of Liquid Engines 2 
 
Using the failure categorizations provided in the early failure database along with the design information 
also contained in the database, Table 2 shows the failure probability from the 1st and 2nd flight for US 
launch vehicles by design element that are applicable to the hypothetical launch vehicle. 
 
Table 2: Failures by Design Element on the First 2 Flights 
Design Element Failures 
Number of Design 
Elements Flown 
Failure Probability 
Avionics 2 151 1.32E-2 
1st Stage Liquid Engines 2 203 9.85E-3 
Solid Propulsion  1 161 6.21E-3 
Upper Stage Liquid Engines  3 148 2.03E-2 
Stage Separation  3 220 1.36E-2 
Fairing Separation  3 149 2.01E-2 
Thrust Vector Control  1 512 1.95E-3 
 
Because most of the probabilities of failure in Table 2 are on a per design element basis and the new 
launch vehicle has multiple engines, solid rocket motor, etc., the overall probability of failure of each 
design element must take into account the number of elements as shown in Table 3. 
 
Table 3: Estimated Design Element Failure Probabilities for New Launch Vehicle 
Design Element 
Failure 
Probability 
per Design 
Element 
Number of 
Launch 
Vehicle 
Design 
Elements 
Total Design 
Element Failure 
Probability 
Avionics  1.32E-2 1 1.32E-02 
1st Stage Liquid 
Engines 
9.85E-3 3 2.93E-02 
Solid Propulsion  6.21E-3 2 1.24E-02 
Upper Stage 
Liquid Engines  
2.03E-2 2 4.02E-02 
Stage 
Separation  
1.36E-2 1 1.36E-02 
Fairing 
Separation  
2.01E-2 1 2.01E-02 
Thrust Vector 
Control  
1.95E-3 7 1.36E-02 
Total 1.34E-01 
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The values in Table 3 show an estimate of 0.134, or about 1 in 7.5 for the first flight of the new launch 
vehicle.  The estimate is higher than the empirical baseline estimate because the complexity of the 
vehicle, e.g. the number of engines, is higher than the average launch vehicle. 
 
3.4.  Modifying the Baseline Estimate Accounting for an Assurance Program’s Effectively 
Maturing a Launch Vehicle 
 
An effective assurance program can be equivalent to maturing a launch vehicle so that the probability 
of failure on the first flight is equivalent to the probability of failure after a given number of launches in 
which identified failures and defects were corrected.   Launch vehicle reliability growth to maturity can 
vary based on how well the launch provider uncovers and corrects issues.  Maturity does not mean that 
failures will not occur, but rather that latent problems in the design have a low probability of failure or 
random problems can occur during manufacturing, but any higher probability events have been found 
and corrected.  This methodology requires that “maturity” be defined, and in order to do that Figure 2 
was developed to show failures and successes as a function of launch sequence number. 
 
Figure 2: Launch Vehicle Successes and Failures by Flight Sequence Number 
 
From Figure 2, failures (in red) are less probable with increasing flights and after 10 flights the failures 
become more or less random.  Table 4 gives the estimated failure probability versus flight number. The 
estimates in Table 4 are based on no failures occurring. The failure probability estimates range from 1/7 
with 0 flights (the baseline estimate) to 1/75 for after 10 flights. The estimates decrease in a smooth 
manner with a decreasing rate of change.  
 
As an initial estimate, the first flight failure probability for the new launch vehicle can be taken as 
ranging from the values shown in Table 4 depending on the effectiveness of the assurance program. An 
average assurance program or possibly a new untested technology would not take any additional credit 
for finding and correcting issues prior to the first flight which would provide it with an unadjusted first 
flight failure probability value.  An effective assurance program that identifies and corrects all latent 
failures and defects prior to the first flight can be taken to be equivalent to achieving a failure probability 
equivalent to having achieved 10 flights. This would result in the first flight failure probability of a new 
vehicle being equivalent to a mature vehicle with effective identification and correction of 
manufacturing and operational defects.  A value somewhere between the two end points could be judged 
appropriate based on assessment of the effectiveness of the assurance program and successful past 
experience with design elements.  Justification of the amount of credit taken would be documented in 
terms of identification of past history of design elements if any, identification of historical failures and 
how the assurance program has addressed them, additional testing performed, etc.  A more detailed 
assessment would be based using safety case and evidence analysis [2,3].  
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Table 4: Estimated Failure Probability Versus Flight Number 
Flights 
Estimated Failure 
Probability 
1 in Flights 
(1 / Failure 
Probability) 
0 0.134 7 
1 0.070 14 
2 0.048 21 
3 0.036 28 
4 0.029 35 
5 0.024 41 
6 0.021 48 
7 0.018 55 
8 0.016 62 
9 0.015 68 
10 0.013 75 
 
 
3.5.  Synthesized Probability of Failure by Design Element 
 
The synthesis method just described in the example provides a method of estimating the overall vehicle 
reliability growth estimate based on a number of launches.   Because different design elements may have 
different assurance approaches and some may be quite rigorous and others less so, the above method 
can be enhanced to a design element level where results similar to Table 4 are developed for each design 
element.  The same methodology used on the overall vehicle was applied at a design element level.  
Mature values of 5, 7, or 10 flights were used based on the flight history of the design element.  The 
results of the analysis are provided in Figure 3 and shows the estimated probability of failure by design 
element for the first 10 flights of a new launch vehicle with and experienced developer.   
 
Figure 3: Probability of Failure Estimate by Design Element 
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3.6.  Example of Synthesizing the Launch Vehicle Estimate Based on Design Elements and Credit 
for the Assurance Program 
 
As an example of how this methodology can be used, assume that it is determined that the design and 
assurance program for the new launch vehicle matures some design elements beyond a completely new 
first flight as in Table 5. 
 
Table 5:  Example Assessment of Design Element Assurance Programs for New Launch Vehicle 
Design Element Flight Credit Assumption 
1st Stage Liquid 
Engines 
0 
New launch vehicle with a new 1st stage engine 
design.   No credit is given for maturity past the 
first flight. 
1st Stage Solid 
Motors 
5 
The 4 segment design is the same as used on 
previous launch vehicles.  The single historical 
design failure was effectively corrected.  Credit is 
given based on the historical success. 
2nd Stage Liquid 
Engines 
5 
The upper stage engine has a history of success 
with other launch vehicles as an upper stage 
engine with one design related failure and 
numerous successes after the failure occurred.   
Thrust Vector 
Control 
5 
The TVC for the solid rocket motors and upper 
stage engines are the same as used in other launch 
vehicles and has extensive experience and 
success.  For the core stage liquid engines, the 
TVC is a new design.  Credit is given for the solid 
rocket motors and upper stage 
Fairing Separation 0 
New launch vehicle with a new fairing design.  
Several historical failures have occurred. No 
credit is given for maturity past the first flight. 
Stage Separation 0 
New launch vehicle with a new separation design.  
Several historical failures have occurred. No 
credit is given for maturity past the first flight. 
Avionics 0 
The software will be unique so no credit is given 
for maturing the design element past the first 
flight. Several historical failures have occurred in 
both hardware and software. 
 
The enlarged markers on Figure 4 show the values that would be used for the first flight equivalent 
analysis.  The results are shown in Table 6.  With the additional credit for the assurance program as 
described, the probability of failure for goes from 0.134 to 0.0898 or a 34 percent improvement.  One 
caution that needs to be mentioned is that new launch vehicles, particularly those with new technologies 
may have failure modes that have not been experienced before.  This should also be taken into account 
when assigning the level of maturity based on the assurance program for the design elements. 
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Table 6: Example First Flight Failure Probability with Credit for Assurance Practices 
Design Element 
Design 
Element 
Flight 
Equivalent 
Experience 
Level 
Adjusted 
Total Design 
Element 
Failure 
Probability 
Total 
Adjusted 
Design 
Element 
Failure 
Probability 
Avionics 0 1.32E-02 1.32E-02 
1st Stage Liquid Engines 0 9.85E-03 2.93E-02 
Solid Propulsion  5 1.74E-03 3.47E-03 
Upper Stage Liquid Engines  5 2.45E-03 4.89E-03 
Stage Separation  0 1.36E-02 1.36E-02 
Fairing Separation  0 2.01E-02 2.01E-02 
Thrust Vector Control  5 3.14E-04 8.73E-03 
Total 8.98E-02 
 
Figure 4: Example Design Element Maturity with Credit for Assurance Practices 
 
 
3.7.  Bridging to a PRA Model 
 
The method just described provides a much better estimate for early flight failure probability than a 
mature PRA model, but a PRA model can provide a good mature level failure probability, so finding a 
way to bridge between the two methods for a consistent program level (i.e. consisting of many flights) 
failure probability assessment is desirable.   
 
First flight failure probability for an average launch vehicle can be an order of magnitude higher than 
the same vehicle’s estimated mature failure probability, and therefore early flight failure probability 
would be dominant if no credit is taken for heritage hardware or assurance practices.  If credit is given, 
then the early failure probability would not be as significant a contribution to the overall failure 
probability. 
 
In order to bridge between the early flight failure probability and PRA estimates, the credit given for 
assurance practices may be thought of as a derating factor (𝑓) for the early failure probability .  For 
example, in Figure 4, the assurance for the payload fairing is not given any credit so 𝑓 = 1, i.e. it has 
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the early failure probability while the upper stage engines are given 5 flights credit which is about a 0.88 
reduction from the baseline no credit case, so 𝑓  =0.12 This derating factor can then be applied to 
generally combine the early flight and PRA failure probability using the standard mixture-model 
formula: 
 
𝑝 = (1 − 𝑓) ∗ 𝑝0 + 𝑓𝑝𝜀  
 
where 𝑝0 is the PRA estimate and 𝑝𝜀 is the early flight failure probability estimate.  Using this equation 
the early flight failure probability and PRA values are appropriately weighted based on the assessment 
of the assurance program and hardware and are not double counted.  At a point where the early flight 
failure probability equals the PRA value, 𝑓 would be 0 and the design would be considered mature. 
 
4.  CONCLUSION 
 
New launch vehicles have historically had a significantly higher average failure probability than mature 
launch vehicles, and PRA analyses do not adequately assess their failure probability.  Assurance 
programs for launch vehicles have an impact on the success or failure probability of launch vehicles.    
By reviewing historical failures against assurance practices, greater confidence can be had for the first 
flight of a new vehicle and using the methodology above can translate into a more accurate estimate of 
first flight failure probability and can be used bridged into an existing PRA model. 
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